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Can International Law Work?
A Constructivist Expansion
Harlan Grant Cohen*
I.
INTRODUCTION
The United States' reputation regarding international law has recently come
under a spotlight. Candidates to succeed George W. Bush as President
campaigned on promises to "restore our reputation as a nation which respects
international law, human rights, and civil liberties,"'1 and with his election, the
burden of fulfilling those promises has since fallen on the new President, Barack
Obama. "The outgoing administration has left an 'immense' weight of
expectations on Barack Obama to restore the reputation of the U.S. around the
world," observed former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.2 "He [Obama] is
determined to restore the reputation of the U.S. internationally and he will seek
to do this by having the U.S. behave lawfully." 3 For many, both in the United
States and elsewhere in the world, these are solemn, important promises.
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law; J.D., New York University
School of Law, 2003; M.A. History, Yale University, 2000; B.A., Yale University, 1998. Thank you
to Dan Bodansky, Anthony Colangelo, Monica Hakimi, Peggy McGuinness, Christiana Ochoa, and
Bo Rutledge for their insightful thoughts and comments. Daniel Tilley provided both invaluable
research assistance and long, thoughtful conversations on the review. Most of all, thank you to
Shirlee Tevet Cohen who let me work on this, and even read a draft, while on our vacation.
I. Democrats Unfiltered: The Eight Candidates on America 's Place in the World, WASH.
MONTHLY, July 1, 2007, at 38 (quoting Bill Richardson at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, February 8, 2007); see also Bill Richardson, A New Realism: A Realistic and Principled
Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan-Feb. 2008, at 142 ("If America is to lead again, we need to
remember this history and to rebuild our overextended military, revive our alliances, and restore our
reputation as a nation that respects international law, human rights, and civil liberties.").
2. Leonard Doyle, Cheney May Try to Force Obama 's Hand Over Iran, INDEP. (London),
Nov. 10, 2008, at 20.
3. The Burden of Great Expectations, NAT'L Bus. REV., Jan. 23, 2009; see also Ved Nanda,
We Must Adhere to International Law, DENVER POST, Jan. 15, 2009, at B13 ("Unilateralism,
exceptionalism and 'preventive war' options espoused by the Bush administration must be rejected
to restore America's credibility and reputation."); Closing Guantinamo, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Nov. 16, 2008, at F2 ("[B]eginning the process of closing Guantinamo in the name of justice and to
restore America's tarnished human rights reputation must be a top priority for Obama.").
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But what do such promises really mean? How much of this is just talk-
friendly, but empty rhetoric? Does the United States' reputation for following
or not following international law actually matter? For skeptics of international
law, these words are at best, "cheap talk,"'4 at worst, dangerous sentimentality.
For these skeptics, international law is a myth; states follow it only when it
happens to be in their interests. The only reputation the United States should
want is one for resolve in pursuing its goals.
Some of these skeptics have turned to rational choice methods to prove
their point. Casting aside the regular references states and international lawyers
make to law and legal obligations-a practice often referred to as "law talk"--as
unreliable and unscientific, these skeptics attempt to model the behavior of
states as rational actors. Doing so, they argue, demonstrates the inherent
weakness of international law. States appear to follow international law when it
aligns with their interests but break it when it does not. Law plays no
independent role in shaping the actions of states, and "law talk," as ubiquitous as
it may be, as real as it may seem to international lawyers, is no more than an
illusion.
Andrew Guzman, himself a rationalist, 6 takes these statements much more
seriously. In How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory,
Guzman's important, elegant, and insightful new book, he develops a
comprehensive rationalist response to the international law skeptics. Unlike the
skeptics, Guzman takes "law talk" seriously. Rather than dismissing it, he seeks
to understand and explain it. The result is an account of international law that is
not only superior to that suggested by the skeptics from a rational-choice
perspective, but more importantly, is able to explain aspects of the system that
seem so important to international lawyers. 7
The key to this account is the concept of "Reputation." 8  Rather than
dismissing the concept, as some other rationalists have done, 9 Guzman seeks to
4. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 174
(2005).
5. See id. at 13 ("[U]nder our theory, international law does not pull states toward compliance
contrary to their interests.").
6. ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
16-17 (2008) (adopting "a set of rational choice assumptions"). I use "rational choice" and
"rationalist" largely interchangeably in this essay.
7. See id. at 11 (observing that "[v]irtually every individual and state that participates in
international dealings appears to take international law seriously, suggesting that the institution of
law has some force"); id. at 98-100 (explaining law talk); id. at 142-47 (explaining soft law); id. at
194-201 (explaining opiniojuris).
8. For the purposes of this review, I will use "Reputation" when referring to the mechanism
Guzman develops in the book, and "reputation" when referring to its more general, ordinary
meaning.
9. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 102 ("First, scholars sometimes exaggerate
the reputational costs of treaty noncompliance, thereby overstating the possibilities for interstate
cooperation, especially multilateral cooperation. Second, scholars sometimes lean too heavily on a
2009]
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understand how it might operate in game-theoretic terms. The result is the most
important of his "Three R's of Compliance": Reciprocity, Retaliation, and
Reputation. 10  The reputational benefits of following agreements and the
reputational harms of breaking them change the expected payoffs of specific
state acts. When plugged into the complex, multiplayer, multiple-iteration
games that define international relations, these changes can produce the
"compliance pull" that international lawyers have long suggested. I I States
concerned about their reputations may choose to comply even when violating an
agreement might otherwise have been in their interests.
Building reputation into game-theoretic models of how states behave also
explains the shape of different international agreements and the choices between
different enforcement regimes. It allows for the formulation of a comprehensive
theory of international law that includes treaties, soft law, customary
international law, and norms. Perhaps most intriguingly, it helps explain opinio
juris, the long-mysterious "psychological" element of customary international
law. In so doing, it provides hope that some of the most intractable problems in
interpreting customary international law can be solved.
All of this marks an extraordinary accomplishment, one rightfully worthy
of praise. Guzman's work is careful and thorough; the number of possible
angles he considers is impressive. Guzman makes a powerful case that rational
choice theory does support international law's claims of legal force and can
explain how international law works. But any project as broad and
comprehensive as this one must raise certain questions and concerns. Although
in many ways admirably modest, the book makes two broad claims, both
succinctly laid out in the title itself. The first is that the account Guzman
presents actually explains how international law works. The second is that this
account can be understood solely in rational choice terms. Despite the many
accomplishments of the book, both of these claims remain unproven.
This essay proceeds as follows. Part I explains Guzman's theory in greater
depth and lays out some of the greatest accomplishments of the book. Part II
lays out three specific challenges to Guzman's broadest claims. The first two of
these question the inclusiveness of Guzman's theory: How much of international
law does this rational choice account actually explain? Part II(A) suggests that
while Guzman's reputation-based rational choice theory can explain many areas
of international law, some, like human rights law, are difficult to understand in
those terms. Reputational sanctions seem insufficient to explain either why
states would follow human rights treaties or enter those agreements in the first
state's reputational concern for complying with international aw.").
10. As Guzman explains, Reciprocity and Retaliation rely on Reputation in order to serve as
effective enforcement mechanisms. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 48 ("To be effective, the threat of
a retaliatory sanction must be credible, and that credibility depends in part on the threatening state's
reputation for punishing violators.").
11. See id. at 41 ("Because international law increases the costs of a violation, it puts a thumb
on the scale in favor of compliance... ").
[Vol. 27:2
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place. At the same time, international practice seems to have evolved in
recognition of these shortcomings, adopting types of agreements and methods of
enforcement designed to leap over states and interact directly with individuals
and other substate actors. Under such circumstances, the explanatory power of
rational choice theory seems to run out; constructivist or liberal theories of
international law designed to explain the flow of ideas through the international
system or the relationship between international actors and domestic
constituencies seem necessary.
Part II(B) raises a different inclusiveness challenge. As Guzman himself
admits, his account is primarily concerned with "situations where cooperation is
difficult." 12 By contrast, in situations where states are already cooperating or
eager to cooperate, "international law does no heavy lifting and might even be
said to be superfluous." 13 But this assessment is far from obvious and depends
on initial assumptions about the purposes and mechanisms of international law.
Many have argued that international law is less about the effect it has on present
day calculations of state self-interest than about its long-term potential to
reshape state conceptions of self-interest itself. Under this constructivist view,
international law's real force is in its ability to reshape the discourse of the
international community and state conceptions of what is possible and even
desirable in international relations. International law is thus most powerful
when it makes cooperation easy, when it makes international law seem almost
superfluous. For Guzman, international law is most relevant when it changes
the perceived costs and benefits of any particular state action. The constructivist
view, by contrast, asserts that international law is most effective when it ceases
to be part of the calculation at all, when the rules of international law become so
deeply internalized that they are followed simply as a matter of course, as little-
reflected-upon state self-interest. To assess whether Guzman's account actually
explains international law, one must thus first determine where international law
is doing most of its work. Are most international law rules followed as part of
cost-benefit analysis "games" or as matters of nearly subconscious state habit?
Finally, Part II(C) looks more closely at Guzman's rational choice
mechanism of Reputation. Guzman's theory, although perhaps reconcilable
with liberal and constructivist ones, 14 is meant to provide a comprehensive
rational choice explanation for how international law works. Guzman is actually
quite modest in his defense of rational choice methods, recognizing possible
roles for other methods like liberal or constructivist theory. 15 But Guzman does
12. Id. at 30.
13. Id. at 29.
14. See id. at 21 ("Institutionalism assumes that state preferences are given and fixed. One can
think of liberalism and constructivism as theories that help us to understand how these preferences
come about.").
15. See id. at 20 ("The most sensible approach when studying international law is to recognize
that different approaches are suited to different tasks."); id. at 21 ("It is not the purpose of this book,
however, to offer a defense of rational choice or to mount an attack on other methodologies. There
2009]
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argue that rational choice assumptions provide more testable and falsifiable
models than others 16 and are "the most promising for the study of international
law." 17
His conception of Reputation, however, raises serious questions about
whether such an approach is possible and whether rationalism really can provide
predictions that liberalism and constructivism cannot. Guzman tries to frame
Reputation in solely rational choice terms, as "judgments about an actor's past
behavior used to predict future behavior," 18 but the process he describes seems
difficult to understand and the results difficult to predict without other theories
that can explain, describe, and predict the actual content of any given state's
reputation. In order to understand Reputation's effect on compliance decisions,
one would want to know who within the state has a reputation for abiding by
international law and who in the state cares about the state's reputation for
abiding by international law. More importantly, one would want a theory of
issue linkages-why state actions with regard to one international law rule, say
genocide, will or will not have reputational effects on other areas of
international cooperation, like trade or investment. For Reputation to serve as
predictor of future compliance, states must first assign some value to specific
rules and their violations. 19 Why some violations will be seen as de minimis,
while others worthy of sanction, cannot be explained without some theory as to
how norms are transmitted through the international system and how they can
shape state expectations.
Part III suggests a way forward. The beauty of How International Law
Works is that its deficiencies can quickly be redefined as strengths. Part III
argues that in its current form, Guzman's account provides a compelling rational
choice answer to the question: can international law work? The book solidly
answers: yes. But Guzman's account can actually do much more. Part III
argues that Guzman's Reputation-based account is much more than a rational
choice theory. Rather, it is the beginning of a bridge between constructivist,
liberal, and rational choice accounts. Guzman's concept of Reputation provides
a vehicle for explaining how domestic concerns are translated into state-to-state
relations and how states communicate normative concerns to each other. His
account carries the seeds of a more comprehensive theory of international law
is surely room within the study of international law for a multiplicity of methodologies.").
16. Id. at 21 (explaining that "rational choice assumptions yield theory that is more
parsimonious and predictions that are crisper and more falsifiable than is the case for alternative
approaches." Elsewhere, I have suggested that falsifiability may not be the best touchstone for a
theory of international law. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Historical American Approaches to
International Law, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 485, 498-99 (2009) (suggesting that constructivism
may be better aligned with historical methods than social science ones).
17. GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 21.
18. Id. at 33.
19. How serious is the violation? Is the violation easy to forgive or a portent of many more
violations to come? Does the violation suggest that the other state is unwilling to follow that rule, or
dismissive of the international rule of law more generally?
[Vol. 27:2
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that can integrate various branches of international law theory.
But Part III also argues that Guzman's account provides only half the story.
A fuller account of international law, this Part argues, must consider two
different axes of international law: (1) the horizontal one that Guzman describes,
in which states interact in a series of games and in which international law
changes the costs and benefits of compliance, and (2) a vertical one, in which
international law rules are internalized by states and taken off the negotiation
table. Again here, Guzman's account provides some interesting insights into
this more general account. His conception of Reputation can help explain both
how rules come to be internalized as well as the relationship between those that
have already been internalized and those that are still being balanced against
other state interests, a possible clue to the aforementioned mystery of issue
linkage.
II.
THE RATIONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Debates over international law's status as law, and more specifically
international law's influence on state actions, seem like a constant feature of the
international law landscape. 20 Recently, an influential, though controversial, 2 1
attack on international law's force has come from rational choice theory. In
their book, The Limits of International Law, Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith
argue that rational choice theory suggests that international law exerts no
independent force on state actions. 22 States appear to comply with international
law when it otherwise serves their interests; when their underlying preferences
no longer align with the international law rule, states quickly defy it.23
How International Law Works is a compelling rejoinder to these claims.
20. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1177
(2007) (seeking to get "get beyond the endless debates both about whether international law is law at
all and whether it has any real effect"); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An
Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 515 (2005) ("Is international law
really 'law'? Political scientists and legal scholars outside the international law field regularly raise
this question."); John K. Setear, A Forest With No Trees: The Supreme Court and International Law
in the 2003 Term, 91 VA. L. REV. 579, 670 (2005) (referring to "the frequently asked question, 'Is
international law really 'law?"").
21. The book has excited considerable response, mostly critical, from international law
scholars. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Book Review: Rationalism and
Revisionism in International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1411 (2006); Symposium, The Limits of
International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253 (2006) (including articles by Kenneth Anderson,
Daniel Bodansky, Allen Buchanan, David M. Golove, Andrew T. Guzman, Margaret E. McGuiness,
Peter J. Spiro, and Kal Raustiala).
22. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 90 ("[W]e have explained the logic of treaties
without reference to notions of "legality" or pacta sunt servanda or related concepts."); id. at 108
(concluding that "modem multilateral human rights treaties have little exogenous influence on state
behavior").
23. See id. at 90.
2009]
HeinOnline  -- 27 Berkeley J. Int'l Law 641 2009
642 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Guzman does not seek simply to demonstrate that international law can be
reconciled with rational choice theory. 24 On the contrary, his ambition for How
International Law Works is to use rational choice theory as the foundation for "a
comprehensive and coherent theory that seeks to explain how [international law]
works across its full spectrum."2 5 Among Guzman's goals are: to "explain[]
how international law is able to affect state behavior despite a lack of coercive
enforcement mechanisms," 26 to explain international law's different sources-
treaty, soft law, custom, and norms-"within a single framework, 2 7 to explain
the shape and form of international agreements, 28 and possibly to explain
patterns of compliance and non-compliance. 2 9 The fact that the book is largely
successful on these counts is an enormous triumph.
A. Choosing Rational Choice
To develop his theory, Guzman chooses a rational choice methodology and
rational choice assumptions over other possible options. He does so because he
believes them "to be the most promising for the study of international law,"
30
"yield[ing] theory that is more parsimonious and predictions that are crisper and
more falsifiable than is the case for alternative approaches." 3 1  Among the
assumptions he thus makes are that states are "rational, self-interested, and able
to identify and pursue their interests," 32 that "state preferences are given and
fixed,"'33 that states "seek to maximize their own gains or payoffs, ' 34 and like
Posner and Goldsmith, he assumes that states "have no innate preference for
complying with international law."
35
Although he clearly prefers this methodology, Guzman is quite fair in his
24. For some other recent attempts to explain international law from a rational choice
perspective, see generally George Norman and Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law
Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541 (2005); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DuKE L. J. 559
(2002).
25. Guzman, supra note 6, at 8-9.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Id. at9.
28. See id. at 119-81 (chapter on international agreements).
29. See, e.g., id. at 86-91 (discussing why reputation may or may not lead to compliance).
30. Id. at21.
31. Id.; see id. at 17 ("Because the model is built on assumptions that make cooperation
difficult, we can have greater confidence when the results suggest ways that cooperation can come
about.").
32. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 21.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id.; see also GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 10 (explaining reasons for excluding
"a preference for complying with international law from the state's interest calculation").
Interestingly, however, Guzman's theory may actually explain how a general preference for
compliance with international might come about. See infra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 27:2
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treatment of various competitors, accepting their explanatory power and
usefulness in some situations. 36 In some cases, those methodologies might even
be reconciled with his own. 37 As Guzman explains modestly, "[i]t is not the
purpose of this book ... to offer a defense of rational choice or to mount an
attack on other methodologies." 38  Two of the theories he considers for his
analysis but rejects, constructivism and liberal theory, are nonetheless worth
mentioning.
Liberal theories "open[] the black box of the state and consider[] the role of
substate actors." 39  Such theories suggest that "state interests are best
understood as an aggregation and intermediation of individual interests. Sources
of power and interests are found within and between states. International law is
driven from the bottom up." 40 Such theories are complementary to Guzman's
approach; they can, for example, help explain how state preferences are
formed. 4 1 Guzman rejects these theories, however, because their concern with
countless individual actors renders them too complex "to provide a predictive
model of state behavior."4
2
Constructivist theories "ask[] how norms evolve and how identities are
constituted, analyzing, among other things, the role of identity in shaping
political action and the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and
structures." 43 Such theories suggest that state interests and state identity are not
constant but are instead "constructed" through legal rules, interaction with other
states, and the activities of individuals and advocacy groups. International
institutions can "influence the norms and attitudes of states," and "international
agreements and rules can affect attitudes and beliefs."'44  Guzman finds
"appealing plausibility" in such accounts. Here too though, the theory is
rejected because of its complexity. As Guzman explains, "Constructivist writers
have to date not advanced a general model of state behavior. Until such a model
36. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that the rise of human rights "is difficult to
explain without resort to changing norms and preferences" as described by constructivist theories).
37. See id. at 21 (noting that while "[b]oth liberalism and constructivism can be reconciled, at
least partially, with an institutionalist approach," "[nieither liberalism nor constructivism can be
reconciled with institutionalism in all instances").
38. Id. (noting also that "our understanding of international law can be further improved by
serious inquiries using each of the aforementioned approaches").
39. Id. at 18.
40. Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J.
INT'L L. 64, 79, 82 (2006).
41. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 21 ("One can think of liberalism and construetivism as
theories that help us to understand how these preferences come about.").
42. Id. at 19 ("It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to construct a general, tractable, and
predictive liberal theory of policymaking in a single state, let alone one that also captures the
interactions of many states.").
43. Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Book Review: Rationalism and Revisionism in
International Law, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1404, 1411 (2006).
44. GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 19, 20.
2009]
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exists, there is no way to use constructivism to study the full field of
international law within a single framework." 4
5
B. The Value of Reputation
Guzman's rational choice account starts by looking at the various "games"
states play in international relations to see what influence international law
might have on state actions. Guzman quickly disposes of a series of "easy"
games-common interest, pure coordination, and battle of the sexes-where
states have straightforward interest in cooperation. 46  In these games, the
payoffs from cooperation are higher than the payoffs of going it alone, and
international agreements simply formalize cooperation that would likely have
happened anyway. 47 "[I]ntemational law does no heavy lifting."4 8
International law might do more work when states are engaged in a more
difficult game, such as a Prisoner's Dilemma. Guzman uses the Anti-Ballistic
Missile ("ABM") treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union as an
example. A cooperative strategy-an arms control agreement-presents a better
outcome for both states than competition-an arms race. But if one state defects
and continues building weapons or developing ABM technology, the payoffs to
that state will be much higher and the damage to the non-defecting state will be
that much worse. As a result, in a single-turn game, the United States and
Soviet Union will both choose to defect from the agreement; an arms race will
be the dominant strategy.
4 9
45. Id. at 20.
46. Guzman uses the Warsaw Convention (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage By Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11), which
harmonizes air travel standards, as an example of such an easy game. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at
26-27 ("In this and other coordination games, the players in the game (i.e., states) have an interest in
coordination that trumps their interest in a particular outcome.").
47. Of course, the question then must be asked why states use treaties at all in these contexts.
One important answer that Guzman suggests is that states may not know their counterpart's payoffs
and may be unsure whether a game is actually a coordination game or something more problematic.
See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 27 ("One explanation for why [states] choose to [use more formal
agreements] is that interactions that appear to be coordination games may in fact be some other type
of game. States have an interest in certainty and predictability over time and may, therefore, want an
agreement that will offer some assurance about how others will behave if the payoffs change at some
future date."); id. at 28 ("[S]tates may use a formal agreement to address a coordination game if
there is uncertainty with respect to payoffs. If a state is unsure about the payoffs facing another
state, it may be concerned that what appears to be a coordination game may in fact be a more
difficult-to-solve cooperation problem. Entering into a formal agreement may help to guard against
that possibility."). Alternatively, the states in question may fear that what currently looks like a
coordination game may develop into some other sort of game. See id. at 57 ("[l]f the game in
question, though it looks like a coordination game, has some probability of becoming a prisoner's
dilemma or some other game in which cooperation is more difficult, the states have an incentive to
protect against that outcome.").
48. Id. at 29.
49. See id. at 31 ("This is a classic prisoner's dilemma. Though mutual cooperation yields the
highest total payoff, each party has an incentive to violate the agreement, regardless of what the
[Vol. 27:2
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However, international law, in this case an ABM treaty, can lead to
cooperation in multi-turn games where states are concerned about the future as
well as the present. It does so through what Guzman calls the "three R's,"50
Retaliation, Reciprocity, and Reputation. The impact of Retaliation on the
payoffs of defection and cooperation is most obvious. If a state can sanction
another state for violating an agreement, those sanctions may be sufficient to
disincentivize defection. Reciprocity can lead to compliance where states care
about the future benefits of the deal as well as the present ones. If a state values
future cooperation highly enough, its counterpart's ability to respond to a
violation by withdrawing from an agreement should make the payoff of a one-
time defection less attractive. In essence, the loss of future cooperation has to be
added to the current payoffs of the defection. Together, they may make
defection cost more than cooperation.
Reciprocity and Retaliation, however, will not always be viable options. In
some cases, a violating state may not be interested in the future fruits of that
particular bargain-either its preferences or payoffs have changed or the state
may never have cared about the bargain in the first place-rendering
Reciprocity ineffective. A state violating a human rights treaty may not be
swayed by the threat that a treaty partner will do the same. 51 Retaliation, on the
other hand, is costly for the retaliating state. The costs of retaliating have to be
worth the benefits of future cooperation in order to make it a viable recourse and
deterrent. 52
Reputation, the cornerstone of Guzman's theory, fills these gaps by linking
one agreement to others, even with different counterparties. Guzman defines
Reputation "as judgments about an actor's past behavior used to predict future
behavior." 53  A state's reputation for compliance is an estimate of a state's
discount rate, the extent to which it values future payoffs over current payoffs.
Reputation for compliance "is an estimate of the state's true willingness to
comply even when nonreputational payoffs favor violation." 5
4
Such reputations have powerful effects on the payoffs of international
agreements. A state with a good reputation for compliance will have an easier
time finding partners for cooperative agreements. A partner state will be less
concerned about defection and thus may require fewer concessions to conclude
the agreement. A state with a bad reputation will find cooperation more
difficult. Reputation thus carries real value for states, value that can be modeled
other party does.").
50. Id. at 33.
51. See id. at 45 ("Virtually every important human rights agreement, for example, must rely
on an enforcement mechanism other than reciprocity.").
52. See id. at 48 ("A state that imposes a sanction does so to build or protect a reputation for
sanctioning those that fail to honor their obligations or possibly to end an ongoing violation. The
state accepts a cost today in the hope of getting a larger benefit in the future.").
53. Id. at 73.
54. Id.
2009]
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into state-state relations.
When choosing to violate an agreement a state must consider not only the
costs and benefits of that violation or the costs and benefits of violation on the
continued force of that agreement, but also the cost and benefits of that violation
on its reputation and, in turn, its ability to engage in other valuable cooperative
arrangements in the future. A breach of an agreement may cost the violating
state much more in the future gains of cooperation than it can gain through
present violation of the rule. This change in payoffs becomes a powerful
incentive for states to follow their agreements. Returning to the ABM treaty
example, the Soviet Union's and United States' interest in future cooperation
may change the payoffs enough to make arms control the dominant strategy.
5 5
Reputation may even change a single-turn game into a multi-turn one, linking a
state's willingness to comply with one agreement to its probability of complying
with others.
Reputation can also make the threat of Retaliation more credible. If the
future benefits of a reputation for retaliation (leading, one can assume, to greater
cooperation) are large enough to outweigh the costs of actually retaliating,
violating states may actually have something to fear. 56
Seeing compliance with international law as a function of a state's rational
concern with its reputation and the relative payoffs associated with it, brings
many of the features of the international system into focus. First, Reputation is
no blunt tool. Different states will at different times have different reputations
for compliance (perhaps even with different counterparties). This may change
the likelihood of a particular violation. A state with a good reputation may be
able to snatch the payoffs of a defection or two without too much damage to its
reputation. A state with a bad reputation, at least one that cares about future
cooperation, may be more cautious. Similarly, different compliance decisions
will affect reputation differently. A state will generally get little benefit
reputationally from following an agreement that states would otherwise expect it
to follow. Compliance must seem hard for it to result in reputational gains.
57 If
55. See id. at 38 ("[I]n any given period, each party is better off if it defects. Before choosing
to violate the agreement, however, a state must consider the impact of defection on future payoffs. If
violation generates future costs, these costs may be enough to bring about compliance.").
56. This still leaves collective action problems with retaliation in the multilateral context. See
infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
57. See id. at 79-80 (discussing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, a treaty with 187 members
states that requires "that state parties designed as non-nuclear weapon states... a category that
includes all but five countries . . . , refrain from seeking nuclear weapons" and observing that
"[b]ecause the nonreputational payoffs suggest that these states would behave consistently with the
treaty obligations even if the treaty were not in existence, observer states have no reason to interpret
compliance as any sort of positive signal about reputation."). A state with no reputation for
compliance, e.g. a newly independent state or a new regime, may want to ratify many easy to follow
agreements to establish at least some positive reputation. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 90
("Because observing states have only weak priors about the new state's willingness to comply with
international legal obligations, each individual compliance decision has a larger impact on the new
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compliance looks too difficult, however, a violation may have less effect on a
state's reputation. Such a violation will be easily compartmentalized and may
not be seen as evidence of a lower general discount rate. 58 Second, as this last
point suggested, Reputation will not always provide enough of an incentive,
enough of a change in payoffs, to engender compliance. Where the costs of
compliance or benefits of non-compliance seem sufficiently high, Reputation
will do little to stop violations. Thus, as Guzman suggests, when national
security is at issue, when the very life of the state is in question, little
compliance against perceived self-interest should be expected. 59  Finally,
Reputation can help explain the form of international agreements and the
mechanisms states choose to include within them. 60
C. Taking International Lawyers Seriously
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of Guzman's theory is its ability to
explain the intuitions and observations of international lawyers. Guzman, unlike
Goldsmith and Posner, takes international lawyers seriously. Rather than trying
to disprove widespread perceptions that international law matters, Guzman uses
them as his starting point.6 1 His goal is to explain those perceptions rather than
rebut them.
A good example is "law talk." States describe their international
obligations in legal terms. States spend considerable resources arguing about
the meaning and interpretation of those obligations. When they condemn other
states for violations, they accuse them of acting unlawfully. As Guzman notes,
international law skeptics chalk the endless law chatter up to "cheap talk."
62
Reputation, however, does a good job of explaining law talk. Reputation
involves a great deal of uncertainty. For states to properly assess the payoffs of
any given action they must understand what effect that action will have. States
state's reputation.").
58. See id. at 79 (observing that "[a]s long as all parties expect breach in the event of a war,
there is no reason that past conduct consistent with this expectation would affect the negotiation").
59. See id. at 78 ("When entering into an agreement, states hope that both sides will comply,
but they also recognize that a violation may occur. In fact, they recognize that under certain
circumstances [such as war], violation is to be expected.").
60. See id. at 119-81 (chapter on international agreements). For Reputation to prove useful,
states need actionable information about state compliance and violation. In areas where such
information may be hard to come by, states may negotiate the inclusion of information-gathering
mechanisms within the treaty regime. See id. at 97-98 (citing-as examples of such mechanisms-
transparency requirements, measures to ensure ongoing communications, and reporting and
monitoring requirements).
61. See id. at 11 ("The attitude of states and nonstate actors towards international law also
provides evidence that the institution is important... .Put simply, given that international law is an
expensive proposition, why do states participate?").
62. Id. at 13; GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 174.
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need to know whether their action will be interpreted as a violation and how
seriously it will harm their reputations. As Guzman explains, states have both
general reputations for compliance with international law and more specific
reputations for compliance in specific areas. 6 3 A state will want to know which
reputation a violation will affect. Similarly, states hoping to deter violations
have a strong incentive to make their views of obligations clear. This will be
true both where states want to protect the "true" rule and where they want to
encourage a new one.64 States will be able to get away with much more where
rules are unclear because observing states will not know whether the violation
involved a good faith disagreement over the rule or a general disdain for
international commitments. 65 Violating states will take less of a reputational hit
because observing states will be uncertain about what the act predicts.
6 6
Finally, states that want to violate the rule have every incentive to explain away
their acts. 67 If those states can convince others either that there was no violation
or that they believed they were complying, they should be able to blunt any
negative reputational effect.
NGOs can rationally be expected to argue for their preferred positions as
well. Such an "effort is intended to generate greater consensus on human rights
obligations and persuade at least some people that additional human rights
norms should be considered legal obligations." 68 Their reports on human rights
in various states can provide information necessary for other states to reassess
those states' reputation.
But How International Law Works' reframing of customary international
law ("CIL"), may be the book's single greatest contribution. 69  One of
63. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 101 ("The sensible answer to the question of whether states
have one reputation or multiple reputations, given current understandings about reputation, is almost
certainly 'both."').
64. See id. at 99 (citing the U.S.'s efforts to influence the customary international law of
expropriation by insisting on the "Hull Rule" standard).
65. See id. at 94 ("A good faith effort to comply indicates that the acting state sought to
comply and its violation indicates a difference of interpretation. Had the contours of the law been
clear, it may be that the state would have complied, in which case no reputational adjustment is
called for. A state making a bad faith claim of compliance, on the other hand, knowingly violated
the law and, in so doing, delivered astronger signal about its willingness to do so.").
66. See id.
67. See id. ("[T]he acting state may consider itself to be in violation of the law and be
attempting to muddy the waters by claiming that its actions are permitted.").
68. Id. at 99.
69. Elsewhere, I have suggested that projects such as these, that seek to explain how
international works, can and should help us rethink the sources of international law. Harlan Grant
Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 97-98,
108-09 (2008). Although we need to be careful not to equate intemational law with compliance, we
also do not want a doctrine of sources completely disconnected from actual practice. Id. at 72, 115.
By explaining when and why states will treat rles as law, in this case, as a matter of changed
payoffs, theories such as these can shine a spotlight on the actual criteria used by states to determine
what counts as law in the international system.
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Guzman's goals is "to explain the various sources of international law within a
single framework."'70 Accordingly, he attempts to rethink CIL in rational choice
terms. The result is a version of CIL with fewer internal paradoxes than
orthodox understandings and a theory of CIL more able to explain modem
phenomenon like instant custom.
After running through the various critiques of traditional understandings of
CIL based on consent, 71 Guzman suggests a new definition based on rational
choice. "CIL should be defined as those norms that, because they are
considered to be law, affect state payoffs."' 72 This definition recognizes the
reality that over time states come to consider certain norms law 73 and that the
defining characteristic of the rules is not their form but their effect. More
importantly, it explains compliance with CIL as a matter of the same three R's
as treaties. 74 States will follow CIL where they worry that non-compliance will
end reciprocal benefits (for example, in the treatment of diplomats), lead to
retaliatory measures, or lead to reputational sanctions that hurt future
cooperation opportunities. 75 These reputational sanctions will be particularly
potent if a CIL violation can affect a state's more general reputation of
compliance with international law, thus damaging treaty opportunities as well. 76
As with treaties, states will comply with CIL where they expect compliance to
add value or violations to hurt payoffs.
Perhaps most intriguingly, this new definition of CIL also helps reconfigure
the traditional elements of CIL. CIL is defined not by a pattern of state practice
supported by opiniojuris, or a sense of legal obligation. Instead, opiniojuris is
70. GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 9.
71, Seeid. at 185-86.
72, Id. at 190. This definition presents problems for identifying CIL rules, as Guzman
observes, but those problems may be inherent in the fact that CIL rules are not produced but instead
emerge. See id. at 190-91. For a similar definition of CIL and an argument that such rules can
nonetheless be ascertained, see Cohen, supra note 69, 114-19 (2008).
73, See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 196 ("This theory of how CIL affects states relies on what
are termed beliefs (or expectations) of states. It is important to note that states cannot choose their
beliefs; these are not policy variables that states can manipulate to achieve a desired outcome.
Rather, a state's beliefs or expectations are formed by its interactions with the international
community and reflect its perspective.").
74. See id. at 9 ("[F]ormal treaties, soft law, customary international law, and international
norms all operate through the same basic set of mechanisms.").
75. See id. at 191-92 ("The costs of violating a CIL rule come about in much the same ways as
they do with respect to treaties. A sense of reciprocity, for example, supports some CIL norms....
A violation may also provoke retaliatory action by another state.... Finally, violations of CIL may
also impose a reputational cost because other states will be reluctant to rely on compliance from a
state that has violated CIL rules in the past.").
76. See id. at 191 ("If a state has a single reputation that affects all international legal
obligations, violations of CIL rules will have a negative impact on its ability to extract concessions
from others in exchange for its own promises in future agreements."). See also George Norman &
Joel Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 567 (2005)
(suggesting reputational links between CIL and treaties).
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the central element. 7 7 How or why a norm comes to be seen as law is
irrelevant; the key issue is that it is. State practice provides useful evidence that
states consider a particular rule law, but it is merely evidence, not a constitutive
element. Moreover, because CIL is concerned primarily with the effects of
compliance and noncompliance on payoffs, it is the opinio juris of observing
states rather than the acting state that matter.78 States act on the basis of their
prediction of how other states will react. The question they ask is whether other
states will perceive an act as a legal violation worthy of sanction.
Guzman describes a number of current areas of controversy in CIL doctrine
that this new theory helps explain, but perhaps the most interesting is "instant
custom." Particularly in the human rights context, debate has raged over the
past decades over purported rules of CIL that are relatively new and have little
support in traditional conceptions of state practice. Instead, proponents of these
rules point to U.N. declarations and other statements by the international
community. Such "instant custom," problematic under traditional doctrine, is
perfectly reasonable under Guzman's theory. Since opiniojuris is the only real
element of CIL there's no specific baking time required for a new rule to
emerge. A rule can become CIL as quickly as states can perceive it as such.
Moreover, the absence of state practice is untroubling. State practice would be
useful information, but so might be U.N. declarations.
One of the strengths of How International law Works is its thoroughness.
Guzman carefully considers the effect of his approach in a wide variety of
contexts and on innumerable doctrinal issues. It's a testament to Guzman's
achievement that all of them cannot be considered here.
III.
DOES REPUTATION WORK?
As mentioned above, Guzman's claims are in some ways admirably
modest. Nonetheless, implicit in both the title and the book itself is a claim that
this account can describe and explain the bulk of international law. This Part
lays out three specific challenges to this claim: (1) that the account may have
trouble explaining international practice in certain issue-areas like human rights,
(2) that the account may take too narrow a view of the ways international law
"works," and (3) that the rational choice approach may be, on its own,
insufficient to explain the force of Reputation or to create testable hypotheses of
state action.
77. I reach a similar conclusion using a largely constructivist approach in Cohen, supra note
69, 110.
78. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 194.
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A. Some International Law is Not So Inter-National
One initial question is how much of international law does Guzman's
account really describe? As Guzman ably demonstrates, his rational choice
model can very elegantly describe much of international trade, investment, and
arms control law. But there are areas of international law and specific issues
covered by treaty and custom that seem more difficult to square with the
approach. Although these issues arise in a number of different areas, as will be
discussed below, international human rights law provides a particularly good
example of the problem inherent in this approach.
In some ways, Guzman's account is actually quite helpful in explaining
international human rights law. As mentioned above, 7 9 Guzman's account does
a remarkable job of explaining CIL practice-one far better than any of the
traditional approaches. Guzman's account also makes sense of the "law talk"
practiced by both states and NGOs. 80 Most of all, as Guzman notes, Reputation
does a far better job of explaining agreements with regard to public goods, for
example, human rights or environmental protection, than other accounts. 8 1 As
Guzman explains, in areas such as those, reciprocity cannot serve as a sanction,
either morally or realistically-states cannot punish non-compliance with
violations of their own. 82 The prospect of retaliation is also unlikely to promote
much compliance; where all states are harmed, none may have sufficient interest
in incurring the costs of retaliatory measures. 83  The reputational harm of
violating such agreements, on the other hand, may serve as a legitimate and
effective deterrent. 8
4
But in other ways, the presence and practice of international human rights
law is something of a mystery. First, it is unclear why states would ever enter
into such agreements in the first place. 85 Under the book's theory, states should
79. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
80. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 99. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text for a
fuller discussion.
81. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 68-69 (observing that neither reciprocity and retaliation
"works especially well when the relevant issues involve public goods").
82. See id. at 64-66. If one state tortures its citizens in contravention of its ICCPR obligation,
another state party to the convention will not torture its citizens in response. Such a response would
be neither acceptable nor likely to influence the first state to stop its violation.
83. See id. at 66-68 (explaining that "only those states that impose the sanction (or threaten to
do so) bear the cost of the sanction").
84. See id. at 68-69 ("Reputation can provide an incentive to comply with international
obligations even when reciprocity and retaliation do not, because reputational sanctions require
neither that states choose to impose costly sanctions in an effort to generate future compliance nor
that reciprocal withdrawal of concessions is practical.").
85. CIL rules with regard to human rights are easier to explain. As Guzman points out, CIL
rules emerge solely as predictions of the violations other states will sanction. See id. at 190 (defining
CIL as "norms that, because they are considered to be law affect state payoffs"). Consent is thus
irrelevant. Id. at 196 ("It is important to note that states cannot choose their beliefs; these are not
policy variables that states can manipulate to achieve a desired outcome. Rather, a state's beliefs or
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join treaties when they "are better off with the agreement than with any alternate
arrangement."' 86 This presents a bit of a puzzle with human rights treaties. A
human rights compliant state that has a preference for human rights 87 certainly
gains when other states ratify such treaties. It is unclear, however, what it gains
from joining the treaty itself. It's unlikely to be part of a trade with a human
rights abusing state; why would Zimbabwe trade anything for the United
Kingdom's ratification of a human rights treaty? Nor can it gain much in
reputation since it is already compliant with human rights. 88 Similarly, a human
rights abusing state has little to gain for ratification-by definition, such a state
has little interest in human rights-and much to lose from ratification-
continued violations of human rights would now affect that state's reputation for
abiding by its agreements as well as for good behavior.
Moreover, to the extent states care about their reputations, human rights
treaties look dangerous. Violating a human rights treaty should hurt a state's
reputation more than the same act done in absence of the treaty obligation. As
discussed below, violating human rights treaties may also have reputational
effects (sometimes unexpected) on other, unrelated areas of international law.89
But in many cases, the "State," the part of the state that negotiates and maintains
international agreements, may have little ability to control human rights
violations. Compliance with human rights obligations, along with obligations in
other areas, requires the involvement of a myriad of actors, many of whom the
"State" cannot control. Such compliance may require legislators to act, judges
to affirm, local officials to enforce, and even private actors to acquiesce. This
may pose significant compliance problems for weak states; a weak state may
have little power, for example, to stop discrimination against women at the local
level as required by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women ("CEDAW"), particularly where such
discrimination is culturally entrenched. But it is also true of stronger states:
Brazil has come under fire for its courts' refusal to abide by the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in individual
cases,90 and in the United States, the Executive Branch was powerless to require
Texas police to give VCCR notice or to stop Texas from executing Jos6 Ernesto
Medellin in violation of an ICJ judgment.9 1 Why would a state ever agree to an
expectations are formed by its interactions with the international community and reflect its
perspective.").
86. Id. at 121.
87. See id. at 20 (recognizing the emergence of human rights as a state preference).
88. The one exception might be where a new state has no reputation for international law at
all. Ratifying treaties it can easily follow may be a step towards building a good reputation for treaty
compliance more generally.
89. See infra notes 151-155 and accompanying text.
90. See Kirk Semple, Court Battle Over a Child Strains Ties in 2 Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2009, at A21.
91. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).
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international treaty and its consequent effect on reputational costs and benefits,
where the "State" has so little control over violations? Such a state would in
essence be abdicating control over its reputation.
So why do states ratify human rights treaties? One possible answer is that
violations beyond a state's control are discounted by other states-that they
don't affect other state's expectations of compliance. This is hard though to
square with the reality of human rights, where many of the violations the
international community cares about most take place at the substate level.
Another answer may be that states only hold other states to a due diligence
standard. As long as the "State" does everything it can, it will get the
reputational benefits of compliance.
While both of these answers blunt the danger in ratifying such agreements,
neither explains the incentive to enter into them at all. A third possibility takes
us out of the realm of rational choice, suggesting that human rights treaties are
ratified with domestic constituencies rather than international partners in mind.
Andrew Moravcsik has thus suggested that Western European states ratified
human rights treaties following World War II in an attempt to constrain future
leaders and to entrench certain rights against the revival of fascism or the
expansion of communism.92  The same has been suggested about newly
independent states or newly liberal regimes (for example, South Africa).
Guzman does not reject such an account, but does seek to avoid it.93
A final possible answer is that the ratification of human rights treaties
should be construed as an act of compliance, perhaps with a pre-existing CIL
obligation, rather than as the acceptance of a new obligation. Under such
circumstances, failure to ratify may be seen as a violation of the existing rule,
one that could harm a state's reputation. Alternatively, a new state may ratify to
build a reputation for compliance. 94 States could rationally conclude that
violating the treaty makes them no worse off than violating the pre-existing rule;
at the very least they may get some reputational bump from the very public act
(far more so than violations) of ratification. Similarly, states that care about
human rights might join a treaty in order to increase the normative pressure on
other states to abide by the community norm and ratify. 95 This account is
completely reconcilable with Guzman's discussion of Reputation, but may
92. Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in
Postwar Europe, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 217 (2000). A Liberal account would also
make more sense of Guzman's account of the opposition to a legally binding Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. U.S. opposition is much easier to explain as the product of Jim Crow and fears of
immediate domestic enforceability of a treaty under the Supremacy Clause than as a result of the
reputational effects of possible violations. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 140-41.
93. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 128 ("[Tlhe decision to put such motivations aside is a
pragmatic necessity.").
94. Cf id. at 91 (discussing Ukraine's disavowal of nuclear status after the fall of the USSR).
95. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, DUKE L. J. 621 (2004).
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require rethinking the relationship between treaties, custom, and norms. Under
such an account, treaties no longer operate as agreements between states, but
instead as oaths of fidelity to international norms. Far from being a lesser form
of obligation, custom and norms may at times be the strongest, having deeper
effects on state reputations and actually driving treaty ratifications. 96
A second problem in describing human rights treaties is that it is unclear
how Reputation can effectively deter violations. At least as an initial matter,
Reputation makes violations more costly to a state by making other states more
skeptical of a violator state's willingness to abide by that agreement and other
similar ones. Violations make it more difficult for the violating state to
conclude future agreements and gain future cooperation in that area. This works
well if what we are discussing are trade or investment treaties-future treaties in
those areas may be more valuable than any specific violation. But these
incentives seem absent in the human rights context. Can the threat of
withholding future human rights coordination from a state really deter it from
torturing prisoners, muzzling reporters, or committing genocide? It seems
unlikely that a human rights abusing state is particularly swayed by other states'
refusal to ratify future human rights treaties. The threat of excluding Sudan
from a new human rights treaty if it fails to hand its president over to the
International Criminal Court seems pretty empty. On the contrary, the world
reaction to states that fail to follow human rights norms appears to be to
encourage/pressure those states to sign more human rights agreements rather
than fewer. 97
One response to this argument is that human rights treaties are not
particularly effective: proof, perhaps, that in the absence of effective
reputational sanctions international law does not work. 98 This is certainly true
to an extent, but as ineffective as human rights treaties are, it goes too far to say
that no compliance takes place. One need look no further than the European
human rights system to see that states will at times reshape their behavior in
order to bring it in line with international human rights law.99 Although difficult
96. See Cohen, supra note 69, at 110 (2008) (defining the strength of an international rule not
by its form but by how deeply it's internalized or how legitimate it seems). A related argument
would be that states ratify human rights agreements in order to partake in certain club goods. Here
too though, ratification has little to do with the benefits of that treaty, rather than other cooperation
to which it might be linked.
97. One might think that the pressure would be to ratify agreements with stronger monitoring
or enforcement mechanisms-this would be in line with Guzman's theory that states continually
update their expectations of compliance-but in reality, the trend seems to be to encourage as wide a
membership in such treaties as possible, allowing more reservations and making enforcement
mechanisms optional.
98. Cf. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 121 ("The bottom line remains.., that there is
no evidence that ratification of human rights treaties affects human rights practices.") and Oona
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Ill YALE L.J. 1935, 1994 (2002)
(noting negative relationship between human rights treaty ratification and human rights practice).
99. See, e.g., Dearbhail McDonald & Tim Healy, Birth registration laws facing repeal after
transgender ruling, IRISH INDEP., Feb. 15, 2008, available at http://www.independent.ie/national-
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to parse, anecdotal evidence from elsewhere in the world is visible as well.
Explaining this compliance thus requires something beyond a theory of
state reputation for human rights. One possibility is a robust theory of
linkages, 100 one that explains when a state's violation of human rights will
impact its reputation for international law more generally, that is, when
censorship or ethnic cleansing will negatively impact a state's ability to do other
things internationally, such as to cooperate on trade or attract foreign
investment. Guzman describes such linkages, discussing how states may have
different reputations for compliance and how some violations of international
law may affect specific reputations while others will affect more general
ones.10 1 One could imagine certain human rights violations, perhaps arbitrary
police action, impacting a state's more general reputation for respecting the rule
of law and accordingly changing other states' expectations of treaty compliance
more generally. 102 So too can one see how rogue states can commit violations
egregious enough to destroy their reputations for international law entirely. 103
But in general, defining Reputation as state expectations of future compliance
seems unable to explain these linkages on its own. It is hard to see any direct or
obvious relationship between a state's treatment of local dissent and its
willingness to abide by a trade agreement. On the contrary, a strong-armed
government at home may be better able to maintain credible control over its
international obligations. 10 4 This was arguably the case with Chile under
Pinochet. 105 Accordingly, to the extent that we do see linkages between human
rights and other issue areas ' 06 -admittedly, an open empirical question-
explaining them would require a deeper theory regarding the normative
news/birth-registration-laws-facing-repeal-after-transgender-ruing-1290090.htmI ("If the Govern-
ment does not challenge the declaration [of incompatibility with the European Convention on
Human Rights] . .. the State will change the country's birth registration regime to make it
compatible with the Convention.").
100. See infra Part II(C), Part Ill.
101. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 100-06 ("When making a compliance decision ... a state
will take into account the reputational impact of its actions across all issue areas, but will also
recognize that the reputational sanctions will be largest in the areas closest to the one at issue.").
102. See U.S.T.R., 2005 NAT'L TRADE ESTIMATE REP. ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 125-26,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Reports Publications/2005/2005_NTEReport
/Section_Index.html (noting that "[b]oth foreign and domestic companies often avoid seeking
enforcement actions through the Chinese courts, as skepticism about the independence and
professionalism of China's court system and the enforceability of court judgments and awards
remains high").
103. GUZMAN, supra note 6, 102.
104. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
105. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 103.
106. Downs and Jones have expressed skepticism that such reputational linkages across issue
areas exist at all. See George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and
International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 107 (2002). They suggest that where states have
responded to a violation in one area with actions in another, those actions are best viewed as a form
of punishment or retaliation rather than a rational response to new information about the violating
state's reputation. See id.
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commitments of the international community, one that could explain why
different international rules carry more or less weight and why different
violations will be seen as more or less important. 107
The other possibility is a robust theory of domestic or substate enforcement
of human rights. Such a theory would move us away from rational-
institutionalist explanations towards liberal ones. Such a theory would look at
the domestic legal effect of international human rights treaties or the ways in
which international agreements can galvanize or empower domestic
constituencies.
Notably, such liberal theories have support in human rights practice and
treaty design. Human rights advocates seem well aware of the weaknesses of
state-to-state enforcement in that area. As a result, human rights treaties have
increasingly adopted mechanisms specifically directed as transnational advocacy
groups, domestic constituencies, and individual claimants. Granting individual
claimants a right to petition international bodies, as in the First Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR and the Human Rights Commission, 10 8 is an obvious
example. But human rights treaties have adopted other more creative
mechanisms as well. CEDAW, for example, requires states to increase female
representation at both the domestic and international level. 109 The hope is that
CEDAW can thereby become self-enforcing, empowering domestic
constituencies of women who will demand compliance from their governments
and societies. 110 Similarly, many human rights treaties include reporting
regimes. Although similar, such regimes are distinct from monitoring regimes,
which Guzman describes as mechanisms for increasing information on
compliance and improving state calculations of reputation.'' Rather than
simply allowing states to monitor each other through inspections, reporting
regimes require states to inspect and explain themselves to an international body
and the international community. States prepare their own reports on the
progress of women's rights in their territory. The goal is to force states out of
passive inaction, to become conscious of their problems, and to engage with
107. Cf id. at 102 ("The answer, of course, is that there is no answer. What constitutes an area
for this purpose [Reputation] will depend heavily on context."); id. at 103 ("Notice that the acting
state cannot control the extent to which behavior in one area affects its reputation in other areas.").
108. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
109. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted
Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
110. Cf Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should Ratify the Women's Rights Treaty
(CEDA W), CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 263, 270 ("In such countries as Nepal, Japan, Tanzania,
Botswana, Sri Lanka, and Zambia, CEDAW has been empowering women around the globe to
change constitutions, pass new legislation, and influence court decisions.").
I 11. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 97-98 (describing monitoring requirements as one of the
strategies states use to promote more complete information and thus retain the compliance pull of
reputation); id. at 133 (describing varying levels of effectiveness of monitoring provisions with
regard to border measures and human rights treaties).
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them. Here too, the hope is of creating a domestic constituency, perhaps within
a state's Foreign Ministry, responsible for preparing such reports and thus
invested in those issues. 112 Compliance with reporting regimes is imperfect,' 13
but nonetheless real. 114
The use of such mechanisms does not disprove the importance of
Reputation in state-to-state international law games. It does, however, suggest
that fully explaining international law practice may require other theories as
well.
B. The Gravity of International Law
A second question is how well compliance games between states describe
the work international law actually does. Guzman's rational choice theory
provides a very elegant, and quite persuasive, account of how international law
can exert "compliance pull" on states, reshaping their cost-benefit analyses, and
incentivizing them to act differently than they otherwise would. In and of itself,
this is an extraordinary achievement.
But in order to determine whether Guzman's theory explains how
international law works, we first need an account of what kind of work law does.
One type of work is exactly what Guzman describes here. Law solves various
games between states-coordination games, prisoner's dilemmas, battle of the
sexes games-by changing the payoffs of different state actions in favor of
cooperation. Law makes non-compliance more expensive by raising the
prospect of reputational sanctions and makes compliance more attractive by
adding reputational value that can be cashed-in for later cooperation.
But this is only one view of what law does. In the book's account,
international law operates either on a contract theory-law as a bargain between
states-or on something like Holmes' bad-man theory, 1 15 acting as a predictor
112. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home,
35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 648 (1998) ("Not infrequently, officials within governments or
intergovernmental organizations become so committed to using their official positions to promote
normative positions that they become far more than passive sponsors but, rather, complementary
'governmental norm entrepreneurs' in their own right."); id. at 651-52 (discussing "internal
mechanisms" states institute "to help maintain their habitual compliance with internalized
international norms"). Guzman sees these reporting mechanisms as weak forms of monitoring and a
weaker mechanism than limiting reservations. See GuzMAN, supra note 6, at 141 (suggesting that a
"much more rigorous and effective monitoring function" than self-reporting could be imagined).
This assumes, however, that their primary purpose is in state-to-state sanctioning.
113. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 120 (observing that "[m]ore than 70 percent
of parties have overdue reports; at least 110 states have five or more overdue reports; about 25
percent have initial overdue reports; the mean length of time for an overdue report is five years; and
most of these reports are pro forma descriptions of domestic law").
114. See, e.g., Initial Report of Guatemala Submitted to the CEDAW Committee, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/Gua/1-2 (Apr. 2, 1991); Initial Report of the United States of America to the Committee
On the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc CERD/C/35 I/Add. 1 (Oct. 10, 2000).
115. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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of the benefits of compliance and the punishment for non-compliance. What's
missing is an account of what H.L.A. Hart describes as the "internal point of
view."1 16 For many, law does something more than simply coerce compliance;
law creates a sense of obligation to follow the rule. The difference between law
and coercion, or between law and contract, is that it exerts an independent force
on actors to follow the rule; actors follow the rule not because of its negative or
positive outcomes, but because it is law. Others go even further, arguing that
law is most effective when actors follow the rule almost as a matter of habit-
the rule is internalized to the point that compliance and non-compliance are no
longer considerations. Individuals drive on the correct side of the road, stop at
red lights, or even wear seatbelts 1 17 without generally considering the reasons
for following the rule.
Various theorists, many of whom might be described as constructivist, have
tried to apply these insights to international law. 118 A good example of such a
theory is Harold Koh's Transnational Legal Process. 119 According to this
theory, states come to comply with international law through a process of
"interaction, interpretation, and internalization." 120 The process begins when
different international and domestic actors force interactions with one another-
a diplomatic dispute, a court case, a public campaign--over proposed rules of
international law. These interactions result in an interpretation of the rule in
legislation, a court decision, an executive order, or bureaucratic regulations.
Through this process, the rules become increasingly binding as a matter of
domestic law, and adherence to these rules becomes increasingly commonplace
and internalized. "Through this repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation, and
internalization-the transnational legal process-international law acquires its
'stickiness,' and nations come to 'obey' out of perceived self-interest that
becomes institutional habit." 12
1
A good example might be the training of militaries in the laws of war.
States have spent centuries wrangling over the shape and content of the laws of
war. Once adopted though, states often implement the rules through military
codes and training. The military is trained in the rules, not the cost-benefit
analysis behind them. Over time, the agreed-upon rules come to be followed out
of habit and are seen as aspects of ethical soldiering. It should thus be no
surprise that the uniformed military in the United States provided some of the
116. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (1961).
117. See Koh, supra note 112, at 629-33 (describing combination of four different compliance
strategies used by regulators to enforce new seat belt norms).
118. See generally Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 705 (1988); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 95.
119. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181 (1996).
120. Koh, supra note 113, at 626.
121. Koh, id. at 655. "By domesticating international rules, transnational legal process can spur
internal acceptance even of previously taboo political principles." Id. at 643.
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vocal opposition to Bush administration reinterpretations of those rules. 122
Although not part of his discussion, such a process actually seems like a
natural outgrowth of Guzman's theory of Reputation. Where states are
sufficiently concerned about their reputation in a particular area, they will have
strong incentives to combat accidental non-compliance. They will want to enact
the new international law rules into law, formalize them in regulations to be
followed by the bureaucracy, and train officials and others to follow the rules as
a matter of course. Over time, the rules may be followed with little reference to
their original cost-benefit analysis. The rules may even reshape state
preferences themselves, turning what was once a difficult game like a prisoner's
dilemma into a simple coordination game.
But the success of such a process essentially removes it from Guzman's
account. Guzman's account does not try to explain areas of international law
where states already have a preference for cooperating and where states would
arguably do so with or without an international agreement. In such cases,
"international law does no heavy lifting and might even be said to be
superfluous." 123 For Guzman, "International Law is only worthy of study if it
does more."1 24 Instead, Guzman's focus is on "situations where cooperation is
difficult." 125
This sort of focus makes sense from Guzman's rational choice perspective.
Analyzing those areas where law seems to be changing the outcomes of games--
where states act differently in the presence of law than their preferences would
normally dictate--provides the crispest, clearest tests of international law's
impact on state behavior. The problem is that while such an analysis may
122. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1098 (2006) ("It is noteworthy, however, that these
U.S. policies have been protested most strongly by the uniformed military..."); Tim Golden, Tough
Justice: After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 24, 2004 ("Military
lawyers were largely excluded from that process in the days after Sept. 11. They have since waged a
long struggle to ensure that terrorist prosecutions meet what they say are basic standards of
fairness."). One might also note how debates over torture in the United States resulted in
interpretations of the rule by the Congress, see the McCain Amendment 1977 to the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act of 2006, which amendment became part of the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Tit. 10, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-40 (2005) (declaring that "[n]o person in
the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense ... shall be subject to any
treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field
Manual or Intelligence Interrogation," and that "[n]o individual in the custody or under the physical
control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be
subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment"; defining "cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment"), and by the Court, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
629-35 (2006), which then resulted in changes to the Army Field Manual, see newly added
Appendix M to the Army Field Manual, U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, HUMAN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS (Sept. 6 2006), available at http://www.army.mil/
institutionfarmypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf.
123. GUzMAN, supra note 6, at 29.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 30.
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demonstrate occasions when international law does work and may demonstrate
to international law skeptics that international law can work, it's not at all clear
that it demonstrates how international law works most often.
To the extent we believe that international law can change state preferences
over time, a hypothesis with which Guzman would seem to agree, 126 there are
reasons to doubt that this rational choice story captures most of what
international law does. First, as discussed above, once states agree on a
particular rule, they have strong incentives to avoid accidental violation. One
can thus assume that states will take whatever action they think necessary to
encourage ordinary compliance with the rule. States are likely to take discretion
over whether to follow the rule out of the hands of all but the most important of
state officials. As a result, one should expect that during the normal life of the
rule, the rule will simply be followed by those state agents who administer that
area of state policy--customs collectors, for example-with little thought of
noncompliance on their state's reputation. 127
Second, by focusing on those occasions in which cooperation is difficult,
Guzman limits himself to those situations where the choice between two actions
remains close. In many of those scenarios, an international law may change the
payoffs of cooperation or defection, but not enough to guarantee compliance.
As Guzman notes, this is certainly true for questions related to national security,
where law's thumb on the scale on the side of compliance is met with a full fist
of other concerns weighing in favor of noncompliance. 128 But to an extent this
is true of all difficult areas.
By contrast, where law has effected a change in state preferences
themselves, the rule in question is no longer even being balanced; it has been
taken off the table entirely. The rule is followed even where a cost-benefit
analysis of compliance, if it were undertaken, might suggest against following
the rule. It is reasonable to suspect that a great deal of compliance takes place
this way, perhaps more compliance than in the scenarios Guzman discusses.
Many rules of international law may be taken off the table for long periods of
time in this way. The pluses and minuses of territorial conquest are rarely really
considered. While states may consider violating individual treaty provisions,
they rarely question the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda as a whole. During
times of crisis, tactics like torture may get put back on the table, but for many
126. See id. at 20 ("It is surely true that norms matter in international relations and international
law, and constructivism attempts to account for the fact that norms shift over time.").
127. Of course, this story can be reconciled with a rational choice model. States determine
based on cost-benefit analysis that removing discretion in most cases is the better strategy. The
point here is that that analysis is relatively removed from most actual instances of compliance. In
general, this essay does not argue that these phenomena cannot be reconciled with rational choice.
Instead, the argument is that these phenomena blur the line between rational choice and
constructivism, perhaps suggesting that these forms of inquiry are more alike than different.
128. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 78 ("A state that has a powerful national security reason to
violate an agreement ... faces nonreputational payoffs that provide a strong incentive to ignore the
commitment.").
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states, it may normally not even be thought an option; the cost-benefit analysis
of violating the rule will not really be considered.
Accordingly, one could argue that international law does more actual work
in shaping easy games than hard ones. We could return here to the example of
the law of war. The law of war requires states to distinguish between military
and civilian targets and to minimize unnecessary civilian casualties. It seems
reasonable to expect that this rule has more impact in shaping initial targeting
choices and rules of engagement, in designating the types of weapons and
munitions in ordinary use, and in subconsciously taking total war off the table as
at least an initial option than it does in shaping decisions about whether and how
to attack an apartment building sheltering terrorists. 129 Guzman's approach, by
ignoring the former situations, may be systematically biased towards
undercounting compliance and may fail to explain those situations in which
compliance is most likely.
In a sense, Guzman's theory deals with the surface or aboveground level of
international law, where international law rules can be seen and evaluated as
part of a cost-benefit analysis. What's missing are those rules that are
submerged beneath the surface and largely invisible. These rules exert an
unseen gravitational pull on states and possibly on other rules still at the surface.
Thus pacta sunt servanda, from beneath the surface, gives weight to treaties. As
will be explained in Part III, this gravitational pull may also help explain the
reputational linkages between different rules. Guzman's theory does not explain
this vast underworld of international law. As he admits, explaining how rules
become submerged, how they exert force on states, and how they sometimes
gurgle back up to the surface probably requires a constructivist or liberal
theory, 130 approaches he appreciates 13 1 but would like to avoid. Depending on
how vast this subterranean world is and the strength of its gravitational pull on
states and other rules, this may signal serious limitations in a solely rational
choice approach. That said, Guzman's approach is not inconsistent with
constructivist and liberal accounts of those submerged rules, 132 and may, as
129. This is distinct from Guzman's point that compliance is less likely in national security
situations. See id. His argument there is that even where the law places a thumb on the scales in
favor of compliance the balance will likely still weigh in favor of noncompliance as the most
powerful of state interests-survival-is on the other side. See id. at 125 ("Faced with [a] ticking
time bomb scenario, the decision as to whether to torture or not will surely not be made on the basis
of the international legal commitment."). The point here is that this pattern results when compliance
with the international law rule has been placed on the debate for discussion. Where that rule has
been subconsciously incorporated into state preferences, the option of noncompliance may not even
be considered. In Part III, I will discuss further why some internalized rules return to the table for
balancing.
130. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 20 (suggesting that constructivism "may be an important
part of the explanation for broad changes in states behavior over time," and that growing concern for
human rights "is difficult to explain without resort to changing norms and preferences").
131. See id. at 20 ("Though this book adopts institutionalist assumptions, I recognize the value
of both liberal and constructivist approaches.").
132. Seeid. at21.
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discussed in Part III, provide important clues to how they work. If Guzman
were to fully embrace such approaches as complements to rational choice, his
theory has the potential to be truly comprehensive.
C. Rational and Rationale
As explained above, 133 Guzman's goal is to "to advance a coherent and
general theory of how international law influences state behavior," 134 using
rational choice methods. Guzman chooses rational choice because of it provides
simpler, more testable models of state behavior. 135  Although liberal and
constructivist theory provide "appealing plausibility" in their account of
international law and may provide "an accurate description [of international law]
in at least some cases," 136 they are less amenable to creation of general, testable
models of state behavior. 137
But can Guzman's key mechanism, Reputation, really be explained in
solely rational choice terms? It is important to note here what this question is
not asking. Guzman is refreshingly modest in his ambitions for rational choice
theory and magnanimous to proponents of rival theories. Guzman states quite
clearly that this book is not meant as a defense of rational choice theory at the
expense of others. 138 It would, accordingly, be entirely unfair to criticize his
account for its failure to embrace other theories. Others can write those books.
The question asked here is different and more fundamental. Is Guzman's
account itself capable of explanation in solely rational choice terms? Does a
rational choice conception of Reputation have enough substance, by itself, to
explain how international law works, or is it too abstract to provide meaningful
predictions of state behavior? By adopting a Reputation-based account, I will
argue, Guzman has inched over the border between rational choice theory and
constructivism. Filling out his account, developing models of state behavior that
are crisp and falsifiable, may require embracing his new theoretical home as his
own.
As explained above, 139 Guzman defines "a state's reputation for
compliance with international law as judgments about an actor's past response
133. See supra Part l.A.
134. GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 24.
135. Id. at 21 (choosing rational choice because it "yield[s] theory that is more parsimonious
and predictions that are crisper and more falsifiable than is the case for alternative approaches.").
136. Id. at 20.
137. See id. at 19 (diagnosing that "It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to construct a
general, tractable, and predictive liberal theory of policymaking in a single state, let alone one that
also captures the interactions of many states."); id. at 20 (explaining that "as is true with liberalism,
this flexibility makes it difficult for constructivism to produce a general and tractable theory of state
behavior.... Until such a model exists, there is no way to use constructivism to study the full field of
international law within a single framework.").
138. Id. at 21.
139. SeesupraPartl.
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to international law obligations used to predict future compliance with such
obligations." 14 0 The goal of Reputation is to capture a state's discount rate with
regard to a particular agreement, a particular area of international cooperation,
and international law more generally. This is a complex process, many aspects
of which How International Law Works explains well. Guzman explains why
violations will affect different states' reputations differently and why certain
violations, like those during war, will be excused as aberrational. 141
But the most complex element of this process is that it involves a great deal
of mindreading on the part of states. Reputation might be described as a second-
person, rather than first-person, view. States considering a particular act must
consider how other states will react; states reacting to a perceived violation must
figure out what that violation means to the violating state.
It is hard to imagine how any of this can be done solely through rational
choice. States do not have perfect knowledge of their counterparts' preferences.
Deciding what an action will mean to a state requires first determining the
normative commitments of that state and the larger international community. A
violation that seems technical and de minimis to one state may seem
fundamental to another. 142 As Guzman admits, states may have little idea what
actions mean to other actors and may thus have little control over their
reputations. 14 3 This explains the phenomenon of "law talk"'14 4 between states
and NGOs: States and others use such talk to either signal their own normative
commitments or to shape those of others. 14 5 Law talk is designed to give
reputational meaning to particular acts. Such a process seems to take us out of
140. GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 73.
141. See id. at 78-79 ("Though the [Kyoto] [P]rotocol does not provide an exception for
national emergencies, countries recognize when they sign any agreement that there are
circumstances in which compliance will not be forthcoming. . . . If military conflict or severe
domestic unrest explains why a potential signatory breached a similar obligation in the past, will this
fact hamper its ability to participate today? As long as all parties expect breach in the event of a
war, there is no reason that past conduct consistent with this expectation would affect the
negotiation. In effect, the agreement has an implicit exception in the event of war.").
142. Is rendition to torture from outside of U.S. territory a technical violation, see Summary
Record of the 2380th Meeting, Consideration of Reports Under Article 40 of the ICCPR, Dialogue
between the Human Rights Committee and the Delegation of the USA, 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.2380 (July 27, 2006) (quoting U.S. delegation explaining that the "delegation found it
difficult to accept that the conjunction in the phrase 'within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction' could be interpreted as meaning 'and/or'. That was particularly implausible given that
the Covenant negotiators had rejected the proposal to substitute the word 'or' for 'and'," and
"respectfully disagree[ing] with the Committee's conclusion that article 7 of the Covenant contained
a non-refoulement obligation with respect to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. That conclusion went well beyond the language of article 7 and the scope of the non-
refoulement provision contained in article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment"), that can be excused or something that raises
more serious questions about U.S. compliance more generally?
143. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 103-04.
144. See supra Part I.C.
145. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 98-99.
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the territory of rational choice and into that of constructivism. Reputation forces
states into what looks like a constructivist dialogue, as they try to discern and
shape the normative regime under which their actions will be judged. In fact,
states considering the normative commitments of other states and adapting their
acts accordingly might be the definition of constructivist norm internalization.
Liberal theory seems similarly necessary to this mindreading. 146  In
determining the meaning of a particular state's acts, observing states must
determine those acts' position within the first state's domestic politics. Given
what other states know about a particular state's political system, do violations
seem likely to be repeated? A single expropriation of foreign property by
Canada may be explained away as aberrational, while the same expropriation by
Venezuela under a populist-nationalist president may be seen as an omen of
things to come. 147
Medellin148 provides a useful illustration of the questions states must ask.
What should states make of Texas' failure to provide consular notice as required
by the VCCR or its refusal to abide by the ICJ judgment in Avena?14 9 What
should states make of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of the ICJ and
international obligations or the President's memorandum ordering Texas to
comply? Whose position matters for predicting future compliance? Is the
incident aberrational or an indication of a larger popular American
exceptionalism dangerous for American obligations? Answering these questions
requires states to develop their own theories about the impact of American
domestic politics and political structure. 150
146. At the outset, any prediction of a state's discount rate seems to require some estimation of
the stability and perception of international commitments in domestic politics. Is the state unstable
and prone to fits of populist or nationalist rage? Does a separation of powers within that state cabin
the effects of such rage?
147. Cf GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 102 ("A violation of a fisheries treaty may signal both that
the state is relatively unconcerned about harm to fishing stocks and that there is little domestic
support for environmental measures more generally.").
148. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).
149. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31).
150. That these considerations matter can be seen in the design of state constitutions.
Democracies may place treatymaking in less democratic branches or choose to make treaties self-
executing in order to assuage concerns about the state's ability to abide by agreements in the face of
populist pressure. A state with a questionable judiciary may grant jurisdiction over international
disputes to a more specialized, trustworthy body. See U.S. CONST. art. IIl, § 2, cl. 8 ("In all Cases
affecting Ambassadors . . . the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction."); U.S.T.R., 2005
NAT'L TRADE ESTIMATE REP. ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 125-26, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/ReportsPublications/2005/2005_NTE-Report/Section-Ind
ex.html (noting that China in its WTO accession agreement "committed to establish tribunals for the
review of all administrative actions relating to the implementation of trade-related laws, regulations,
judicial decisions and administrative rulings"; but, cautioning that "[d]espite initial enthusiasm,
foreign observers have grown increasingly skeptical of the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) as a forum for the arbitration of trade disputes"). All of these
are done, in part, to convince other states of the strength of its commitment.
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In essence, Reputation seems to throw all three theories into the hopper.
States make reasoned decisions meant to further state interests, but ones
necessarily inflected with normative commitment and by domestic politics.
Reputation thus blurs the line between the three theories, even suggesting that
they do not exist. Constructivist and liberal theory become the natural
continuation of Guzman's rational choice assumptions, not an unwelcome
addition to them. A solely rational choice approach seems to capture only part
of Reputation's operation.
The problem with a solely rational choice approach becomes most apparent
in Guzman's discussion of linkages. Guzman observes that states will have both
a general reputation for compliance with international law as well as multiple
interrelated reputations for compliance with specific rules or with specific areas
of international obligation. 151 The reputational effect of some violations will be
cabined to that issue area alone; other violations will have broader effects.
"[S]ufficiently egregious violations in a few areas are often enough to
compromise a state's reputation across the board." 15 2 As Guzman recognizes,
potential linkages between areas or between certain issues and states' more
general reputation for living up to its commitments, have "important
implications." 153 But without some constructivist or liberal theory, it's hard to
figure out where such linkages will form. 154  On paper, many commitments
look alike, but as Guzman recognizes, some will be treated as more important
than others. Which issues will be seen as important, which violations egregious
enough to impact a state's overall reputation, seems dependent on the normative
commitments of the observing states. Whereas one might be able to use a
violation in one area of international law to learn more about the violating
state's discount rate in that area, the connections between different areas are far
less obvious. No simple calculus can explain why a sufficiently egregious
human rights violation would affect a state's reputation for trade agreements.
The difficulty modeling these situations, determining how violations will
actually affect state reputations, raises questions about whether the rational
choice method Guzman chooses really does lead to crisper, more predictive
models than constructive or liberal approaches. Hints of this problem are visible
in Guzman's caveat about the real-world examples used in the book. These
"examples should be taken simply as illustrations," and not as "proof of the
Guzman hints that he might be ready to incorporate such considerations into his model. See
GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 73 (observing that a state's discount rate may depend on "the domestic
politics of the state (e.g., the extent to which domestic political structures make violation of
international law difficult or costly)").
151. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 101.
152. Id. at 102.
153. Id. at 104.
154. A frustration Guzman seems to share, see id. at 102 ("The answer ... is that there is no
answer.") and 103 ("[T]he acting state cannot control the extent to which its behavior in one area
affects its reputation in other areas.").
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claim being made." 1 5 5  "One might argue that in each case some other
underlying factors affected the payoffs of states and that the particular influence
at issue in the discussion was not an important factor." 156 This is because the
account here is largely theoretical, and a more "formal investigation" would be
required in order to understand how it applies to real-world scenarios. In
essence, the examples used in the book are merely hypothetical. They
demonstrate how Reputation can lead to compliance. The real question,
however, is whether a solely rational choice account can create anything more
than hypothetical models-whether a rational choice model can actually predict
real world results.
An illustrative example is Guzman's discussion of the decision to make the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") non-binding. 157 Guzman
argues that the U.S. could rationally have chosen not to make the UDHR a treaty
out of concern for the reputational effects of non-compliance. This certainly
sounds like a reasonable explanation. The problem is that history suggests a
different answer. It is well-documented that domestic opposition to a binding
UDHR, mostly from Southern segregationists worried about the future of Jim
Crow laws, played a significant, if not the most significant, role in the U.S.
position. 158 Here, the abstract concept of Reputation predicts the U.S. position,
but only by ignoring where that position actually came from. One can put this
another way: Had domestic opposition proven weaker, the postwar human rights
movement might have won the day and the United States might have supported
a binding agreement much as the Europeans did. 159 Nothing about the U.S.'s
reputational concerns would have changed-Guzman's account would still
predict that the U.S would oppose a binding treaty-but in this case the
prediction would prove wrong.
Again the problem seems to be that rational choice theory explains how and
when international law can work; it does not work as well in explaining how
international law actually does work in concrete situations. Answering that
question seems to require more. Constructivist and liberal accounts seem
necessary parts of the equation.
155. Id. at 22.
156 Id.
157. See id. at 140-41.
158. See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights:
Bringing It Home, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 223 (David Kairys ed., 3d
ed. 1998) ("In 1947 and 1951, petitions were filed with the United Nations documenting and
challenging de jure racial segregation, racial violence, and the status of African Americans in the
United States. While these initiatives contributed to the formal repudiation of school segregation in
the Eisenhower administration and the Supreme Court, the cold war and Southern opposition to
racial equality produced a rightwing backlash against international accountability that continues to
the present."). Thank you to Daniel Tilley for making this point.
159 ... in the form of the European Convention on Human Rights, adopted in 1950.
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IV.
BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION
Where do we go from here? If How International Law Works is limited by
its commitment to rational choice methods, what might a more comprehensive
approach to international law look like? The beauty of Guzman's Reputation-
based account is that it is in many ways capacious enough to incorporate
constructivist and liberal elements. 160  Loosening the rational choice
assumptions of the book can go a long way towards taking the account from one
that explains how international law can work to one that explains how
international law actually does work. Guzman's account creates a template for a
hybrid rationalist-constructivist-liberal account, one broader, more rigorous, and
more descriptive of reality than any of the approaches are on their own.
Reputation, far from simply saving rational choice from the international law
skeptics, becomes something far more powerful: the first ingredient in a more
unified theory of how international law works.
A more comprehensive model 16 1 of how international law works would
start by looking at international law as a function of actions along two different
axes. How International Law Works considers the horizontal one: how
international law works as an external constraint on state action, changing the
payoffs of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior. Along this axis, states are
actively choosing between compliance and non-compliance with a particular
agreement. International law, with its ability to bring reciprocity, retaliation,
and reputation to bear, operates as an additional factor incentivizing
compliance-in some cases, incentivizing compliance enough to overcome
states' normal preference for violation.
But international law operates along another, vertical axis as well. Over
time, states can be expected to internalize certain rules of international law.
Cooperation is valuable to states, and states should want to avoid accidental
violations that might put that cooperation unnecessarily at risk. States thus have
every incentive to make compliance ordinary and habitual. 162 The law of war
160. In fact, Reputation seems to demonstrate that lines between rational choice,
constructivism, and liberal theory are misdrawn. Far from being different theories, they appear to be
parts of the same one. Constructivism is a natural extension of rational choice logic.
161. This is to be distinguished from "the" comprehensive model. As noted above, see
generally supra Part II(B) and in particular notes 119-121 and accompanying text, international law
does many different things. This short section does not attempt to identify all of them (not that it
could) and accordingly cannot suggest a model that encompasses all of them. Instead, this section
merely suggests a broader model that can begin incorporating some of the specific issues discussed
above.
162. That part of the state responsible for treaties and diplomacy might be expected to be
particularly careful in this regard. One might thus expect the U.S. State Department to develop an
institutional bias towards following treaties and other laws; one might expect its professionals to
develop a generalized preference for compliance.
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example above 16 3 is illustrative. In order to avoid accidental violations, states
will incorporate the rules of international humanitarian law into military training
and field manuals, and they may involve lawyers in sensitive decisionmaking.
Over time, one should expect compliance with many of the rules to become
habitual. During a wide array of military activities, violations of the rule will
not even be considered. The law no longer changes incentives, no longer shapes
decisions between compliance and noncompliance. Instead it invisibly takes the
choice off the table entirely. Noncompliance is never really considered. One
might expect some rules, perhaps those protecting civilians, to begin to seem
normatively or morally desirable. In Guzman's terms, the rule itself, rather than
the payoffs of cooperation, becomes a state preference. Further, the more
widely a particular rule is internalized, the more egregious its violation will
seem. A violation of such a deeply internalized rule may signal a general
disdain for international commitments and the rule of law rather than a discrete,
excusable, one-time choice. 164
A more comprehensive theory of how international law works should seek
to explain action along both these axes: both how international law can steer
conscious state choices between different acts and how rules of international law
are internalized, changing the sets of choices states see. Returning to the
metaphor above, 16 5 such a theory seeks to explain the geology of international
law. It seeks to understand the geography and topography of the surface-those
choices and laws states see and act upon. It is this landscape of international
relations that How International law Works attempts to map. But a
comprehensive theory would also try to understand the law's operation below
the surface-how the increasing weight of certain rules pulls them slowly under
ground, where their exact nature and force remain largely hidden. These
subterranean rules exert a special gravity on states, drawing them, almost
unconsciously, toward certain actions and preferences.
Sometimes, submerged rules may gurgle back up to the surface. The
prohibition on torture presents a useful example. As has become apparent in
recent debates, the legal prohibition on torture has a difficult time (as a practical
matter) outweighing concerns of state security when subjected to a cost-benefit
analysis. Instead, where the prohibition on torture seems to have most force is
as a submerged rule. The prohibition is so deeply internalized that, at least
163. See supra text accompanying note 122.
164. This process might thus be analogized to Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral
development. See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PHILOSOPHY
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981). According to this theory, individuals move from obeying rules
out of a fear of coercion, to following them out of a fear of condemnation or a desire to conform, to
following them out of a sense of duty to the community, to following them out of an internal sense
of right behavior. See id. passim; see also Roger Alford, The Moral Stages of Why Nations Obey
International Law, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2008/02/28/the-moral-stages-of-why-nations-
obey-international-law/#comments. Thank you to Dan Bodansky for reminding me of this point.
165. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
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during normal times, the option of torturing a prisoner really is not considered.
Catastrophic events, however, can like tremors disturb the geology of
international rules; once submerged rules may again surface. September 11 th
thus appears to have made the balancing of whether or not to torture seem a
viable and visible choice to many. 166
These two axes or regions are also related. As Guzman recognizes, even at
the surface, different rules carry more or less weight. A violation of one rule
might be excused as technical and unworthy of sanction; 167 the violation of
another may be important enough to harm a state's general reputation for
international law compliance.16 8 The gravitational pull of those submerged
rules helps explain these differences.
In earlier work, 169 I suggested that rules come to be treated as international
law in two different ways. First, some rules are themselves internalized by
international actors. Some of these rules are substantive-states may internalize
a prohibition on genocide or slavery. Others may look more procedural-they
may explain what counts as a binding agreement, what evidence is needed to
legitimate a customary practice as law, or dictate when such an agreement must
be followed. Pacta sunt servanda would seem to fall into this category. A
second category of rules treated as international law builds on this first one.
Rules in this category are treated as law because they meet the standard of
internalized lawmaking or process rules. Thus with regard to human rights,
some human rights may be treated as international law because those rights have
simply been internalized, while others may be treated as international law
because they're embodied in a document that meets internalized standards
legitimacy. 170 These are not one-or-the other choices: We might see some
states treat a rule (for example, prohibiting certain acts in war) as law because
the rule has been deeply internalized and other states (where that same rule has
not yet been internalized) treat the rule as law because it is embodied in a treaty
adopted through legitimate process (the Geneva Conventions). Moreover, the
two categories are fluid: A rule not yet fully internalized may be given extra
166. Obviously, as suggested here, this story is much more complicated, with different actors
reacting differently to the same stimuli. While the prohibition on torture was internalized by many,
it was not by all, and while September 11t, may have changed some opinions on its acceptability,
others, including many in the uniformed military, stood fast.
167. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 85 ("[M]inor violations, such as missing a reporting
deadline, are unlikely to be viewed as a serious breach and, therefore, are unlikely to lead to
significant reputational sanctions.").
168. See id. (suggesting "a refusal to allow inspection of nuclear reactors under the [Non-
Proliferation Treaty]" as an example of"a serious breach of a state's commitments and will generate
a strong reputational reaction").
169. Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93
IOWA L. REV. 65, 108-14 (2008).
170. Such standards might include the determinacy of the rule or the amount and depth of
negotiation that took place. See id. at 106-07, 111-13 (discussing these and other factors indicating a
rule's legitimacy).
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legitimacy by process, and a rule initially treated as law because it was created
through legitimate process, may over time be internalized.
Under this theory, rules on the horizontal axis, rules shaping state choices
at the surface of international relations, gain their force from the internalized
rules lurking beneath the surface. A violation of a treaty, for example, might be
deemed more serious than violation of a soft law rule because of the internalized
nature of pacta sunt servanda. Similarly, a violation of one provision will be
seen as egregious while violation of another merely technical, based on how
deeply internalized the rules described have become.
Thus, this helps explain something that Guzman leaves murky: the relative
reputational valence of different rules. 17 1 The more habitual compliance with
the rule and the more often the rule is unselfconsciously professed, the more
unthinkable the violation of the rule will become. Ethnic cleansing might ruin a
state's general reputation for compliance because of the internalized nature of
that prohibition. Where rule of law norms have been internalized, a state's
refusal to abide by its own court's judgments under a treaty may harm a state's
reputation more than its violation of a specific trade provision. Those rules most
deeply and widely internalized, along with those backed by the strongest notions
of legitimate process, will have the deepest and broadest impact on reputation.
Fully understanding the horizontal axis, the current landscape of
international relations, thus requires a better understanding of the forces at work
below and the process by which rules drop beneath the surface. Although How
International Law Works seems primarily concerned with mapping the surface
rather than plumbing the depths, its insights are considerably broader. The
book's machinery can be usefully repurposed to explore both how rules are
internalized and the relationship between invisible internalized rules and visible
incentivizing ones.
How norms are internalized seems like a paradigmatic example of a
constructivist question beyond the scope of How International Law Works'
rationalist approach. Yet perhaps demonstrating the instability of the boundary
between these two theories, How International Law Works provides
considerable insights into this question. First, as discussed above, 172 Guzman's
theory actually seems to predict the internalization of legal rules. Given the
value of Reputation to states and the unacceptable costs of accidental violation,
states have every incentive to make compliance habitual and nondiscretionary.
States should not want its agents or other substate actors picking and choosing
when to put the states' reputation on the line. One should thus expect
international obligations to be passed into law (where possible), for diplomats,
soldiers, and bureaucrats to be trained in the relevant international legal rules,
171. See supra notes 142-146 and accompanying text; GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 84-85
("Because this book takes a theoretical approach ... there is no way to provide an estimate of the
magnitude of reputational sanctions.").
172. See supra text following note 121; supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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and for states to place international lawyers in roles where they can advise the
state on what the rule requires. It should be unsurprising if these processes
eventually lead to a bias towards compliance or a normative preference for
international rules within these various groups. Reputation thus provides a
rational explanation for the transformation of rules into non-rational 173
preferences.
Second, How International Law Works helps explains norm transfer and
internalization through its discussion of law talk and mindreading. 174 For
Guzman, Reputation is a prediction about a state's likelihood of complying in
the future based on an assessment of prior acts. Making this prediction requires
some mindreading about the state-in-question's view of its obligations and their
relative importance as well as the state-in-question's motives. More
importantly, a state eager to protect its reputation needs to know how other
states will react to specific acts. Will they be seen as violations? Will those
violations be seen as technical, excusable, or egregious? Will those violations
impact only its reputation in that area or in others as well? A state eager to
protect its reputation must discern the normative commitments of its
counterparts; such a state must discern the weight others assign to various
different rules. In essence, a state must read the minds of it counterparts.
This, as Guzman recognizes, is no easy task. As explained above, 175 "law
talk" attempts to fill the informational gap. States and NGOs try to influence
each other's perceptions, to provide "information" 176 about the meaning of
different acts. They make arguments about the meaning, scope, and importance
of particular rules. Guzman's emphasis is on states' supply of information to
either make Reputation more effective or to reduce the reputational sanctions of
a potential action. But as Guzman observes, "[w]hen states make informational
claims, of course, the goal is not always to simply share truthful information
with others." 177 Moreover, he notes that NGOs use such "law talk" "to push the
frontier of human rights law and expand the legal rules to include more types of
conduct." 178 One should expect states to do the same, to try to spread the
preferences of their domestic constituencies and their normative commitments
about international behavior through legal claims and condemnations. 179 At the
same time, states eager to protect their reputations should be interested in these
statements; they provide clues as to how their acts will be received. If the act is
less important than the predicted effect on their reputations, they should be
173. Non-rational in the sense that the preferences become givens and are no longer subjected
to rational balancing.
174. See supra notes 62-68, 142-146 and accompanying text.
175. Id.
176. GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 99.
177. Id. at 98.
178. Id. at 99.
179. Cf id. (discussing strong state rhetoric on expropriations).
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expected to adjust their behavior in light of the expressed preferences of other
states. In this way, norms can be transmitted from domestic constituencies
through their elected officials and NGOs and received by other states.
Reputation might thus explain one aspect of how the normative preferences of
the international community change. 180
Most of all, Reputation makes sense of the relationship between the two
axes discussed above. As Guzman discusses, 181 different violations will have
different impacts on state reputation. Some violations will be excused or
understood. Others will damage the state's reputation in a particular area of
cooperation, while still others will damage a state's general reputation for
compliance. Guzman largely leaves open the question of when reputational
effects will be "compartmentalized" and when they will have broader
"spillover" effects into other areas. Defining an "area" itself is difficult and
"heavily [dependant] on context,"' 182 and an "acting state cannot control the
extent to which its behavior in one area affects its reputation in other areas." 183
This reticence seems driven by the rational choice method of the book. The
best answer that method seems to give is that an act will have spillover effects
when other states would rationally conclude that the act predicts broader
noncompliance. Why states would so conclude, however, seems to require a
constructivist inquiry into the normative commitments of states and how they
form.
In fact, however, Reputation provides an intriguing tool for studying the
shape of these normative commitments. Violations of specific rules will mean
different things depending on how other states perceive the rule in question. If
the rule is perceived as a merely technical one, the reputational effects may be
easily compartmentalized. If, however, the rule is seen as particularly
important, a core rule within international public order, its violation should have
broad effects on the violating state's general reputation for compliance. We can
thus measure and test the normative commitments of particular states or the
international community by modeling the reputational effects of different
violations within different normative worlds. If certain human rights violations
have spillover effects into other areas of international reputation, we can
presume that the international community has adopted a particularly strong
commitment to those norms and places special weight on obedience to them.
On the other hand, if those human rights violations seem to affect only human
180. See id. at 20. It should be noted here that norm internalization does not imply or require
persuasion. States and other actors do not need to be persuaded of the wisdom or desirability of the
rule. All they need to internalize is that the commitment is held by some and that the rule is treated
as law. See Cohen, supra note 69, at 114 ("What is required is an internalization of how the rule is
treated within the system, not an acceptance of values underlying it.").
181. See GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 85 ("The relative importance of an international legal
obligation affects the reputational consequences of violating it.").
182. Id. at102.
183. Id. at 103.
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rights reputations or, perhaps, are excused altogether, we might presume that the
normative importance of human rights remains uncertain. 184  If instead
violations of trade commitments have the broadest spillover effects, then those
commitments can be presumed central to the normative preferences of the
community of states. In essence, Reputation provides a method for testing the
shape of the normative community. Some constructivist inquiries will still be
best served by other approaches-historical, anthropological, sociological, or
philosophical. 185 But Reputation can provide constructivism with at least some
testable, falsifiable hypotheses-hypotheses some have suggested could not be
found. 186
How International Law Works argues that international law can work as a
matter of rational choice. Its implications, however, are much broader. How
International Law Works provides the seeds of a more comprehensive theory of
how international law does works, one that incorporates insights from rational
choice, constructivism, and liberal theory.
V.
CONCLUSION
How International Law Works is an important work. Andrew Guzman has
successfully shifted the starting point for inquiries into how and when
international law operates, answering many questions that had previously been
debated and focusing attention on ones that remain open. His elegant, careful,
and thorough application of rational choice methods to the study of international
law make How International Law Works a must-read for anyone interested in
studying either the mechanisms of international law or when and why states
comply with it.
184. This analysis would allow comparison between different human rights rules and provide
some measure of their weight relative to each other. Genocide might have spillover effects that the
ight to education may not. Violations of civil and political rights might have more impact than
violations of social and cultural ones.
185. See Cohen, supra note 16. International law may gain force through other means, which
cannot be adequately captured by this game theoretic model.
186. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
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